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1.  Introduction 
Comparison of the number of fatalities per million vehicle kilometers for various countries 
reveals remarkable differences in road safety (see U. N.,  1987). For Austria this indicator 
(0.036) is about 1.5 times the respective figure in West Germany (0.023),  1.9 times that in the 
U. K. (0.019),  and 2.3 times that in the U. S. (0.016). In relative terms, then, the death toll on 
Austrian roads is more than double that in the U. S. 
This paper deals with economic aspects of traffic safety, in particular with the problem of 
measuring benefits of reducing traffic accidents. Since it is the aim of traffic safety policy to 
reduce  the  number  and/or  severity of  traffic  accidents,  benefits  of  these  policies  are 
important to measure. In a cost-benefit framework (see Mishan,  1972, 1982, Schofield,  1987) 
such  measures  provide a guideline for the  public  authority responsible for traffic safety 
policy. A  major  element  of  benefits  of  reduced  traffic accidents  is  person  related, and 
concerns deaths and injuries. So, the valuation of changes in risk of mortality and injury are 
of crucial importance to the overall result. However, it is also the most uncertain and most 
controversial element in the analysis. 
Evaluating the societal costs embodied  in these figures is an  interesting and challenging 
task in  itself (see, e. g.,  Schofield,  1987, Jones-Lee,  1976, Jones-Lee  --  Hammerton  -- 
Abbott,  1987). As will be seen in Section 2.3 completely different results can be derived from 
the  application  of  different  methods.  The  international  comparison  of  fatality rates  just 
presented, however, raises an additional policy related question. As will be discussed more 
fully  in  Section 2.2,  policy  makers  can  be  viewed  as  producers  of  traffic  safety.  Their 
"product",  traffic safety,  is  consumed  by the  general  public.  This  "market",  however,  is 
distorted by public good  characteristics of the product,  externalities, and  limited compe- 
tence of agents (see Section 2), all hampering the coordination between supply and demand 
of traffic safety. Nevertheless, coordination between supply and demand also in this market 
is essential for an efficient allocation of resources (see Section 2.2), and therefore needs to 
be accomplished some other way. 
The  cross-national  differences  may  therefore  result  from  two  different  scenarios  with 
different implications for national traffic safety policies: 
1.  Differences between the countries may lead to distinct demand for traffic safety. Efficient 
policy makers would react by supplying road safety in accordance to demand by equating 
marginal benefits and  marginal costs of safety measures. The observed differences in 
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road  safety would just  be the  result of the  producer  efficiently reflecting the  distinct 
evaluations by consumers. 
2.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  road  safety is  evaluated similarly in  the  various  countries,  the 
observed  discrepancies are the result of cross-national differences in either supply of 
safety or the coordination between supply and  demand.  In the first case the countries 
would use different technologies for producing road safety while in the second case the 
safety market would be in disequilibrium in some countries. 
We will come back to this point in Section 4 of the paper. This section presents the results of 
a  contingent  valuation study for Austria,  attempting  to  estimate the  economic  value of 
reductions in risk of death. In Section 2 we will discuss some of the imperfections in the 
market for road safety and their implications for road safety policy. We will focus upon the 
implications for resource allocation and  the guidance  cost-benefit analysis may provide. 
Furthermore, the problem of evaluating human life and health will be discussed in general 
an~l  with  respect  to  two  methods  which  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical  basis  of 
cost-benefit analysis. In Section 3 we present the results of our own empirical analysis which 
applies the contingent valuation method to derive willingness-to-pay estimates for improved 
safety. Section 4 summarizes the paper and draws some general conclusions. 
2.  Theoretical and methodological issues 
2.1  Consumer reactions and imperfections in the market for traffic safety 
The traditional, "technological" approach to traffic safety "treats people as passive in that it 
assumes  that  roadway  users  do  not  respond  to  changes  in  the  traffic  environment" 
(Blomquist,  1988). With this assumption, changes in the technology of the transport system 
have full impact on  transport safety, since they will not  be  counteracted  by behavioural 
changes of drivers. For example, it is assumed implicitly that people do not drive faster on 
broader streets, in light traffic, or when wearing safety belts. 
In contrast, from an economic point of view drivers adjust their behaviour to derive the best 
net result. This "economic" approach takes into account that people have some control over 
risk faced in the transport system. People can choose between modes differing not only in 
terms of  speed,  convenience,  and  monetary cost,  but  also in  terms of  risk of accident. 
Drivers can adjust the speed of travel, the frequency of rests, maintenance of the car, etc., to 
either reduce the risk of accidents or to reduce travel time and expenses. They will choose 
the combination of actions which provides the highest level of satisfaction. 
In the U. S., Peltzman (1975)  triggered a long debate about whether or not safety policy is 
able to  lower fatality rates.  His conclusion  is that once  one  controls for other important 
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factors  like  the  age  of  drivers,  average  speed,  alcohol  consumption,  etc.,  the  extra 
contribution  of safety policy is negligible. Cantu  (1980)  extended Peltzman's analysis and 
reached  similar conclusions.  Graham  --  Garber  (1984),  Crandall  --  Graham  (1984)  and 
Crandall et aL  (1986) derived a much greater positive effect of regulation on occupant safety. 
However, they also show evidence of increased non-occupant danger, which supports the 
view that people's reactions at least partially offset the effects of better safety standards 
("risk compensation"). 
However, the result that safety policy can hardly reduce risk by no means implies that the 
system is in equilibrium and that there is no need for traffic policy. From a theoretical point of 
view the  performance of the transport system is distorted by a number of imperfections 
which destroy its ability to reach an optimum automatically. Some important imperfections 
are 
--  externalities in the behaviour of the agents in the transport system, 
--  "public good" characteristics of transport infrastructure and traffic safety in particular, 
--  limited competence of drivers and systematic errors in the perception of accident risk. 
The  trade-off between  occupant  and  non-occupant  safety found  by some  of the studies 
mentioned  above  is  a  good  example for  externalities in  risk  behaviour.  Unsafe  driving 
behaviour not only increases the driver's own risk of death but also that of other people on 
the  streets.  In  particular  those  who  are  less  well  protected  (pedestrians,  cyclists, 
motorcyclists) bear costs which are the result of other people's behaviour. This not only 
leads to a distortion in modal split but also to an insufficient level of traffic safety. 
Transport infrastructure and traffic safety measures also display features of public goods. 
Street  lighting,  road  maintenance,  snow  clearance,  speed  limits,  alcohol  consumption 
regulations are examples of safety related elements which are characterized by non-rivalry 
and non-exclusion. 
The  third problem with an automatically optimized transport system is related to  peoples 
knowledge  and  perception  of  risk  (see,  e.g.,  Slovic  --  Fischhoff,  1982).  Research  by 
Svenson  --  Fischhoff-  MacGregor  (1985), for example, indicates that drivers believe they 
are more skillful and safer than average and therefore tend to underestimate the risk of their 
traffic behaviour. Another line of research in behavioural psychology shows that people have 
problems processing information on low probability, high loss events (Kunreuther,  1976), 
and  that  people's  behaviour is  influenced  by the framing  of  a  decision  (Kahnemann  -- 
Tversky,  1979).  Both effects are leading to systematically biased behaviour. 
This  last  type  of  problems  is  particularly  discomforting  since  it  questions  subjective 
rationality,  a  cornerstone  in  economic  theory.  Analysts  studying  traffic  safety  have 
investigated this problem  (Bfomquist,  1977, Hammerton  --  Jones-Lee  --  Abbott,  1982). 
There is evidence that this is not a severe problem in this field. Their work shows that people 
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can at least rank sources of risk adequately and  react to changes in risk in a reasonable 
way. 
Nevertheless, all these arguments make it very unlikely that the transport system will obtain 
an  optimal level of traffic safety automatically. Particularly the observation that increased 
occupant safety may be accompanied by reductions in non-occupant safety calls for traffic 
safety policy. 
2.2  The optimal design of traffic safety policy 
Since traffic safety policy is just one in a number of public obligations the question of its 
optimal design arises. Economic theory tells us that resources are allocated optimally when 
they are used to  provide the  highest marginal benefit. In the ideal world  of  neoclassical 
economic theory, which is characterized by perfect competition and absence of externalities 
and  public  goods,  optimal resource allocation is achieved automatically. Although  these 
conditions can  hardly ever be achieved the criterion proves to be useful in more realistic 
situations as well. Cost-benefit analysis rests upon this branch of theory and tries to mimic 
the ideal conditions. It tries to correct for market imperfections and to evaluate intangibles to 
obtain  the  correct  measures  for  comparing  costs  and  benefits  of  some  proposed 
investment. 
Since traffic safety and  other safety related policies aim for reducing  damage to  human 
health and property, cost-benefit analysis in these areas needs to evaluate human life and 
health.  On  ethical grounds,  some policy makers argue that human  life is not subject to 
valuation  at  all  and  that  cost-benefit  analysis  is  therefore  inappropriate  in  this  case. 
Nevertheless, policy makers frequently make decisions which  directly or  indirectly affect 
human  life and  health. They allocate budgets, establish standards, and choose a specific 
level of enforcement. With all these activities policy makers trade off risks for human life and 
health against costs (and other aspects as well) and thus implicitly value risks to human life 
and health and in so doing reveal their evaluation. The cost-benefit framework can help bring 
these implicit valuations into the open. 
Some of the objections against cost-benefit analysis in this area probably stem from the fact 
that the instrument is misunderstood as a substitute for policy making. In reality, cost-benefit 
analysis is but one policy making tool. At the very least it provides a useful and consistent 
framework  in  which  to  consider  issues  (Drummond, 1981).  "It  embodies  a  systematic 
approach to decision making, a way of thinking methodically about the impacts of decisions 
rather than by 'flying the seat of the pants'" (Schofield, 1987, p. 221).  it is hard to see why 
policy makers who have to make decisions affecting human life and health should not take 
advantage of this instrument. 
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2.3  Methods for evaluating human life and health 
There is no doubt that fatalities and injuries are a major negative impact of transportation. In 
1983, for example, 1,756 people were killed on Austrian roads and 64,791 injured (19,774 of 
them severely). 
As already mentioned the most difficult aspect of evaluating the benefits of improved safety 
is in imputing a value to the effects on human  life. Measuring impacts on physical goods can 
be  done  simply by using  some  pricing  system,  but  when  it comes  to  human  fatalities, 
analysts are faced with the problem of attaching a value to a non-market good. Since we are 
dealing with changes in risk, the commodity to be valued is the life of an unknown member of 
a large group  (i. e., a statistical life), not the life of a specific individual. 
The  economic  theory  behind  cost-benefit  analysis  suggests  that  the  missing  price 
information  be  substituted  by  the  amount  people  are willing  to  pay for  the  respective 
"product".  Internationally,  "there  is  a  growing  awareness  that  (this  willingness-to-pay 
approach is) a conceptually more satisfactory way of addressing the issue of accident loss 
savings" (Schofield,  1987, p. 120) than the traditional techniques which attempt to evaluate 
the lives of specific individuals (for Austria see Pfleger -- BrandstMter -- Gehmacher,  1980, 
Failer etal.,  1986, Bundesministerium,  1987;  a critical evaluation of these studies can be 
found in Maier -- Weiss, 1989). In brief, the traditional techniques treat people as investment 
goods and evaluate the damage to this investment good. This approach is not justified by 
economic theory (Schofield,  1987, Maier --  Weiss,  1989). 
The  aim  of  the  willingness-to-pay approach  is  to  estimate  individual's  marginal  rate  of 
substitution between money and the good one is interested in, in our case the reduction of 
the risk of being killed in a car accident. Deriving the value of a statistical life is trivial  from this 
figure. Denote the i-th individual's marginal rate of substitution by MRSi. In a population of N 
individuals avoidance of 1 statistical death per time period requires a risk reduction of 1. The 
amount people are willing to pay for this reduction of risk in that time period is therefore 
~MRSI  1  or simply the  marginal rate of substitution.  average 
IV 
There are two approaches to this problem,  namely the hedonic  price and the contingent 
valuation method. They differ by the way they derive MRS. The hedonic price method uses 
observable behaviour and applies econometric methods to isolate the required estimate. 
The  contingent  valuation  method  is  implemented  by taking  a  survey in  which  individual 
respondents are directly asked for their marginal value of safety. 
Traditionally  economists  were  skeptical  about  the  validity  of  answers  one  gets  to 
hypothetical questions  and  therefore favoured the  hedonic  price  method.  It uses actual 
market transactions  in  labour and  consumer  goods  markets where  risk differences  are 
observable. Since it is quite difficult to identify a market-like relationship in the field of traffic 
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safety direct applications in this area are rare. Btomquist  (1979) estimates a probit model for 
seat belt usage and  derives a figure of  $ 370,000  (1978  US dollars) for the value of life 
therefrom.  Winston  --  Mannering  (1984)  evaluate the  risk of severe injury from  people's. 
choice of automobile make and model. 
A  large number of hedonic  price  studies was  performed  in the  labour market.  Empirical 
estimates display a large range of values (between  6 million in  1982 dollars) and  debate 
continues over which factors are responsible for this dispersion. Recent reviews of evidence 
from the labour market on the value of a statistical life may be found in Gegax  --  Gerking  -- 
Schulze  (1987),  Weiss  --  Maier  --  Gerking  (1986),  and Dfllingham  (1985).  For Austria two 
studies are available (Weiss  --  Maier --  Gerking,  1986, Christi,  1986). Both use data from the 
Austrian  microcensus  but yield quite different results. Weiss  --  Maier --  Gerking find  a 
quadratic  relationship  between  earnings  and  risk  to  fit  the  model  best  and  get  highly 
significant coefficients  on  the  risk variables. These  imply a value of  AS  55 million for  1 
statistical life. Christi, on the other hand,  uses 22 different indicators for working conditions 
in his estimations. For the variable "risk of accident, risk of injury" he gets one positive and 
two negative coefficients in three estimations, where one negative parameter is significant at 
the 5 percent level. This leads him to the conclusion that there are no compensating wage 
differentials and  that  consequently  no  marginal value of  safety measure can  be derived 
therefrom. 
The hedonic price method suffers from the problem of disentangling the relevant influence 
from correlated factors and identifying the exact content of the measured relationship. In the 
context of traffic safety also the problem arises, whether measures derived from the labour 
market can be transferred directly. Transferability is particularly doubtful when estimates are 
based on  a subsample of workers  (e. g.,  only blue collar) and  therefore reflect only this 
group's  preferences.  A  further  problem  with  the  hedonic  price  method  is  of  particular 
importance in our context. It is usually specified in reduced form and thus implicitly assumes 
market equilibrium. Since the road safety market lacks a coordinating price mechanism the 
hedonic price method seems inadequate in this instance. 
The contingent valuation method does not suffer from this problem. By using a questionnaire 
technique to directly ask respondents for their willingness to pay we can derive information 
about  the  demand  function  without  assuming  market  equilibrium.  In  designing  the 
questionnaire accordingly one can focus on certain aspects more specifically and identify 
subcomponents  like the value of reduced risk for other car passengers. These advantages 
are contrasted  by the fact that the resulting estimates are subject to  biases arising from 
several sources. The  most important are: 
Hypothetical bias, which may result from the hypothetical nature of the problem stated. 
Since the respondents are not penalized for errors they might not adequately take into 
account budget and time constraints. 
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Strategic bias may result from respondents suspecting a specific use of the results. They 
might want to see particularly low or high figures and therefore give strategic answers. 
Also respondents might want to please the interviewer and give answers they guess he 
wants to hear instead of their own evaluation. 
Instrument  bias  may  result  from  specific  techniques  used  to  derive  estimates.  If 
respondents are given an ordered list of measures and asked to pick one their answers 
might be biased toward the mean. Similarly, in a bidding game the final estimate might be 
influenced by the starting value. 
Although  these  problems  should  be  taken  seriously,  recent  research  suggests  that 
particularly over strategic bias concern may be unwarranted (Brookshire  --  Crocker,  1981, 
Brookshire  et aL,  1982, Hammerton  --  Jones-Lee  --  Abbott,  1982, Cummings  --  Brookshire 
--  Schulze,  1986, Jones-Lee  --  Hammerton  --  Abbott,  1987). 
Applications of the contingent valuation method are far less numerous than hedonic price 
studies. A full-scale application was worked out in Great Britain (Jones-Lee  --  Hammerton 
--  Abbott,  1987). Respondents ranked death third in the perceived severity of injury, behind 
severe head injury and paralysis. These respondents revealed a willingness to pay to avoid 
death at approximately s 2 million. A similar estimate was obtained in a contingent valuation 
experiment framed in a labour market context by Gerking  --  de  Haan  --  Schulze  (1988). 
Injuries commonly associated with  automobile  accidents,  such  as fractures and  internal 
damage, ranked surprisingly close behind, with avoidance values of  1.5 million. In another 
survey, a life was valued through the willingness to pay for a flight on an airline with a better 
safety record. This survey yielded a figure of s 3.0 million (Jones-Lee,  1976). 
3.  A contingent valuation study for Austria 
This  section  presents  results of  a  transport  related  contingent  valuation pilot  study for 
Austria and  is based on 98 completed  interviews. They were conducted  in Vienna and  in 
Neulengbach,  a small rural place in the vicinity of Vienna,  in  order to  be able to  identify 
urban-rural differences. The sample was drawn randomly from the telephone directories. We 
did not experience unusual rates of non-response. Preliminary results of this study can be 
found  in Maier  --  Weiss  (1989)  and Kopetzky  (1989). 
The questionnaire we used is based on that constructed  by Jones-Lee  --  Hammerton  -- 
Abbott  (1987). We  use the following three evaluation questions(I): 
--  Question 1 asks for the willingness to pay and the compensation required for 4 different 
changes in risk. The problem is framed in terms of the choice of carrier on a business trip. 
Versions A  and  B ask for the amount  people are willing to  pay for risk reductions of 
4/100,000  and  7/100,000,  respectively. Versions  C  and  D  ask for the  compensation 
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required to have them accept risk increases of 8/100,000 and 24/100,000 (willingness to 
accept).  There  is  evidence  in  the  literature that  willingness-to-accept  measures  are 
higher  than  willingness-to-pay estimates  (Knetsch  --  Sinden,  1984, Brookshire  -- 
Coursey,  1987, Coursey  --  Hovis  --  Schulze,  1987, Viscusi --  Magat  -- Juber,  1987). 
--  Question 2 asks for the willingness to pay for the installation of some safety feature in a 
car which reduces risk by 5/100,000.  In the first variant of the question (Version A), this 
safety feature protects only the driver while in the second  (Version B)  it protects the 
passengers  as  well. Thus,  comparison  of  the  results  provides  an  estimate  for  the 
evaluation of passenger's safety. Since the benefits from this investment can be gained 
throughout the lifetime of the car the amount people are willing to pay also relates to this 
period and we expect considerably higher estimates from this question. 
--  Question 3 finally asks for the willingness to pay for a city-wide road improvement which 
improves safety of all road users by 3/100,000.  The two variants differ in the way the 
money is said to be collected. Version A  assumes a door-to-door collection and thus 
allows for free-riding behaviour while in Version B the money is collected by taxes. 
To perform the computations sketched  in Section 4 we have to derive an estimate for an 
individual's marginal rate of substitution (MRSi).  Suppose a respondent is asked what he is 
willing to pay for a reduction in risk of fatal accident from 8/100,000 to 6/100,000 and that the 
answer is bi. Then the appropriate estimate for MRSi  (i. e., the income change due to a unit 
change in risk) is 
bi  bi 100,000 
(1)  MRS i  2 / 100,000  2 
The average of this figure across all respondents is interpreted as the willingness to pay for a 
risk  reduction  which  reduces  the  expected  number  of  deaths  by 1(2).  It  is  sometimes 
referred to as the value of saving 1 statistical life or the marginal value of safety (MVS). 
Table 1  presents  8  such  estimates, which  correspond  to  the  variants of  the  evaluation 
questions. 
As expected, the estimates we get from Question 2 are higher than the results from other 
questions. The ratio is between 5 and 7. This indicates that people correctly depreciate this 
investment over a period of years. Also the first variant of Question 3 yields the expected 
lower figure than  the  second  variant. The  effect of free-riding  is estimated to  be  about 
AS 16 million. The value for saving a life as displayed in Table 1 is in the range between AS 36 
and 47 million. This is in line with the evidence which can be found  in the literature (e. g., 
Jones-Lee  --  Hammerton  --  Abbott,  1987, Gerking  --  de  Haan.-  Schulze,  1988). Also, it 
roughly corresponds to the hedonic price based estimates in  Weiss  --  Maier  --  Gerking 
(1986). However, our figures are in sharp contrast to previous traffic safety values for Austria 
which were based on traditional techniques (e. g., Pfleger  --  Brandst&tter  --  Gehmacher, 
1980, Failer et aL,  1986). 
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The marginal value of safety for different contingent goods 





Version A  93  38.17  6.31 
Version B  94  36.29  5.81 
Version C  94  46.62  2.35 
Version D  96  44.67  2.46 
Question 2 
Version A  87  261.24  41.37 
Version B  87  328.40  45.87 
Question 3 
Version A  91  16.89  2.88 
Version B  87  32.51  4.38 
Comparison of the 4 estimates for Question 1 shows that the estimates for Versions C and 
D,  which ask  for  willingness to  accept  additional  risk  tend  to  be  larger  than  those  for 
Versions A and B, asking for the willingness to pay for a risk reduction. Similar results have 
been found by Knetsch  --  Sinden  (1984),  Brookshire  --  Coursey  (1987), Coursey  --  Hovis 
--  Schulze  (1987), and Viscusi  --  Magat  --  Juber  (1987).  It is also supported by the work of 
Kahnemann  --  Tversky  (1979,  1986). 
To  further  analyse  the  risk  evaluations  obtained  multiple  regressions  with  individual 
evaluations as dependent and socioeconomic characteristics as explanatory variables were 
performed. The result of this analysis is presented in Table 2(3).  Explanatory variables are 
defined as follows: 
INCMED  = 
INCHIGH  = 
SEX  = 
ACCIDENT  = 
EDUCATION  = 
URBCAR  = 
AGE  = 
dummy  variable;  INCMED= 1  if the  individual's net  household  income 
falls into the range of AS 10,000 to 20,000 per month, 
dummy variable; INCH~H= 1 if the individual's net household income is 
higher than AS 20,000 per month, 
respondent's sex, SEX = 1' female, 
1 when respondent had been involved in a severe traffic accident before, 
respondent's level of education; EDUCATION = 5 for respondents with 
a university degree, EDUCATION = 4 for those with highschool degree 
("Matura"), etc., 
1 for respondents from Vienna owning a car, 
respondent's age, 
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=  size of the household, 
=  respondent's number of children. 
Table 2 
Regression  analysis of individual's marginal value of safety by socioeconomic  characteristics 
Question 1 
Version A  Version B 
Intercept  --79.62*  --45.72 
INC MED  9.52  3.69 
INC HIGH  41.08" *  41.32" * 
SEX  --  7.14  --  5.21 
ACCIDENT  -- 13.89  -- 17.89 
EDUCATION  --  4.05  --  3.92 
URBCAR  45.07"*  43.74"* 
A GE  6.47" *  4.76" * 
AGE 2  --  0.07**  --  0.05** 
HH-SIZE  --  7.23  --  7.36 
CHILDREN  -- 18.76  5.86 
/~2  0.21  0.21 
* ... significant at the 10 percent level,  ** ... significant at the 5 percent level. 
By subdividing the data set,  Maier  --  Weiss  (1989)  conclude(4)  that higher income,  older, 
more  educated  people  and respondents with children tend to  reveal higher willingness to 
pay. If we take  into account socioeconomic  characteristics simultaneously, because of the 
relationships  between them this result is only partially retained. The most  important factor 
explaining willingness to pay for traffic safety is the respondent's age. It enters with a highly 
significant positive coefficient for the linear term and a highly significant negative coefficient 
for the quadratic term. This implies a concave relationship between age and willingness to 
pay.  The  marginal  value  of  safety  seems  to  be  pretty  low for young  people  --  in  some 
socioeconomic  groups young people  even have a negative MVS  --  but increases rapidly. 
The  MVS  reaches  its  maximum  at  an  age  of  about  50  years  and  decreases  afterward 
according to the quadratic function. It is interesting to see that we get this result although we 
control for most other important socioeconomic  characteristics. So, we have to interpret it 
purely as an age effect, which means that people's attitude towards risk apparently changes 
considerably with age. This is in sharp contrast to the human capital method which implies 
that values of life decline with age. 
The most  important variable from  the point of view of economic theory, income,  shows an 
interesting pattern. Moving from low to medium income does not yield coefficients which are 
statistically  different  from  zero.  Only when  moving  to  the  high-income  category  we  get 
coefficients which are significant at the 5 percent level. The MVS  for high-income people is 
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almost AS 40 million higher than that of low-income people. As expected, the coefficient for 
medium income is positive but lower than that for high income in both equations. 
Also,  the  variable  URBCAR,  a  dummy  variable for  urban  car-owners  yields statistically 
significant  coefficients  in  both  equations.  People  living  in  Vienna  who  own  a  car  care 
considerably more for traffic safety than people from Neulengbach or Viennese without a 
car. They are willing to pay about AS 45 million more for the same risk reduction. It seems 
that  this  group's  experience with  traffic and  road  hazards  leads to  a  higher MVS.  The 
interaction  variable  URBCAR  clearly outperforms  separate  dummy  variables for  urban 
location and car-ownership. 
All  the  variables  discussed  so  far  yield  statistically  significant  parameters  in  both 
regressions. However, it is also interesting to see which variables remain insignificant. Most 
prominent, education seems to be unimportant for people's risk evaluation(5). The negative 
coefficients even suggest that higher education reduces people's MVS.  Also the dummy 
variable indicating whether a respondent has been involved in a serious car accident yields 
statistically insignificant negative coefficients. The  sign  might  be  the  result of  a  reverse 
relationship between risk evaluation and chance of accident. People with a lesser degree of 
risk aversion (i. e., lower MVS)  face a higher risk of car accident. 
Two additional variables with insignificant negative coefficients are the respondent's sex and 
the size of his household. The first one is rather surprising, since women are often thought to 
care  more  about  safety than  men.  The  household  size variable takes  into  account  the 
number of people over which the household income is spread. A larger household reduces 
per-capita income and thus reduces MVS.  Therefore the negative sign is expected. The 
insignificance of the coefficients is in line with the weak performance of the income variable. 
The  coefficient of the variable "number of children"  is insignificant in both  equations and 
changes signs. Therefore, little can be said about this variable. 
In  general the two  estimations presented  in Table 2  are consistent. The  coefficients are 
similar in quantity as well as significance. This provides additional evidence for the quality of 
our data. The evaluation of road safety seems to be dominated by age rather than gender, 
experience  of  traffic  accidents,  education,  and  to  some  extent  even  income.  So,  as 
compared to the bivariate analysis in Maier --  Weiss  (1989) some influences vanish in the 
multivariate  analysis  (number  of  children,  education),  while  others  gain  importance 
(car-ownership, urban location). 
The  empirical results presented above provide some information about the quality of the 
data set and the validity of the method. The MVS measures in Table 1 show all the expected 
relationships. The standard errors are reasonably small given the small size of the sample. 
Also the two  regressions presented in Table 2 yield meaningful and consistent results. A 
stricter test can be obtained from the questionnaires directly. Since the different versions of 
the  questions  are closely related they provide the  basis for  consistency checks  at the 
respondent level (see Maier --  Weiss,  1989). When  checking our data we found that only 3 
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respondents  gave  inconsistent  answers.  We  conclude  that  there  is  little  basis  for 
questioning the validity of the data and the results. Hypothetical bias does not seem to be a 
problem, since responses are in general consistent. Despite the small sample size in this 
pilot study the contingent valuation method seems to be quite promising in the context of 
road safety. A final evaluation, of course, would require a full-scale investigation. 
4.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper discussed some economic aspects of traffic safety and presented an empirical 
investigation of the value of traffic safety in Austria. This value is of crucial importance for the 
overall design of traffic safety policy since it is the dominant element in the benefit of traffic 
safety policy.  According  to  the  principles of  cost-benefit  analysis resources  should  be 
allocated to traffic safety policy as long as its (marginal) benefits exceed its (marginal) cost. 
In Section 2 of the paper we establish an  economic  perspective and  review some of the 
recent discussion in the U. S. We list a series of imperfections in the transport system, which 
make  it  very  unlikely that  the  system  will  obtain  an  acceptable  level  of  traffic  safety 
automatically. This provides a theoretical basis for traffic safety policy. However, it has to be 
understood that people react to policy measures and sometimes counteract traffic safety 
policies. 
Next we discuss the cost-benefit framework in  more  detail and  point  out what  cost and 
benefits are in the area of traffic safety. We argue that in a safety context efficient allocation 
of scarce resources requires the evaluation of human life and health. Moreover, we make the 
point that any allocation of resources between policy areas implies and reveals valuations for 
human life and health. 
Another problem to which we turn in this section is how to evaluate human life and health. 
We focus our attention on methods which are consistent with the principles of cost-benefit 
analysis and discuss the hedonic price and the contingent valuation in some detail. It turns 
out that in a traffic safety context the contingent valuation method is more appropriate. Both 
methods typically  yield values which are substantially larger than the ones derived from more 
traditional approaches. 
Section 3 presents an  attempt to  measure the  "value of (a statistical) life" for Austria by 
means of a contingent valuation approach. We obtain a "marginal value of safety" (MVS) of 
almost AS 40 million, meaning that in Austria people are willing to trade AS 40 million per 
period of time for a risk reduction which reduces the expected number of fatalities over this 
time period by 1. This figure is substantially higher than the AS 6.8 million computed in the 
context of the Austrian "Gesamtverkehrskonzept"  (Failer  etaL, 1986, Bundesministerium, 
1987).  Nevertheless, our figures are in line with other contingent valuation studies. 
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With  these  figures  at  hand  we  can  come  back  to  the  question  where  the  remarkable 
cross-national  differences  in  road  safety mentioned  in  Section 1  come  from.  Since  our 
estimates do not differ substantially from figures found for Great Britain and the U. S. this 
phenomenon seems to result from differences at the supply side rather than differences in 
evaluation. In Section 1 we  have mentioned two  possible reasons for this result, namely 
1. differences in production technology, and 2. market disequilibrium. Although it is some- 
times argued that Austria's high fatality rates result from transit or high road construction 
costs due to rugged terrain, in our view neither of these arguments is very convincing. The 
first one pushes the demand-side argument one step down and applies it to foreigners. The 
second  neglects that  road  safety can  be  improved  by other factors  as well,  like  lower 
speed  limits, stricter enforcement,  information campaigns, etc.  If the  road safety market 
were in equilibrium these factors should  be of particular importance  in Austria given the 
high road construction  costs. 
In our view there is more support for the argument that the market for road safety is in 
disequilibrium. Since this market lacks a coordinating price mechanism, safety policy relies 
on other sources of information for its decisions. Until recently the only evaluations available 
in Austria were based on inadequate methods and severely underestimated the value of road 
safety. By basing  its decisions on these estimates safety policy in Austria produces less 
safety as is demanded by the public. 
By multiple regression analysis we analyse which factors influence people's evaluation of 
safety. It turns out that age has the strongest impact while income, which is an obvious 
candidate  according  to  economic  theory,  performs  much  weaker.  Interestingly enough, 
urban car-owners value road safety significantly higher than others. This result should be of 
some interest to Austrian automobile associations. 
The implications of our empirical results are obvious. People in Austria are concerned about 
traffic safety and willing to trade a considerable amount of money for improved safety. The 
estimates are comparable to those which were derived for other countries. Basing resource 
allocation -- either directly or indirectly -- on the lower values resulting from more traditional 
approaches  leads  to  a  severely understocked  traffic  safety  policy  and  therefore  to  a 
suboptimal policy design and waste of resources. 
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6.  Notes 
(1) A copy of the questionnaire can be obtained from the authors on request. 
(2) Both elements are defined for a specific period of time. For example, it gives the amount people are 
willing to pay per year for a risk reduction reducing the expected number of deaths per year by 1. 
(3) We  restrict  the  discussion  to  the  two willingness-to-pay questions,  since  estimating people's 
willingness to pay is the main focus of this contribution. Regressions for the other questions gave similar 
but sometimes less pronounced results. These estimates are available from the authors on request. 
(4) This analysis was based on only 48 interviews as compared to 98 interviews available for the present 
paper. 
(5) Of course, the specification we have chosen implies equal increments between all adjoining levels of 
education. We  have tested more sophisticated specifications but could not derive a more powerful 
model. 
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